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On Being the Literal Image of God: Rethinking 
Human Essence as Uniqueness 
Mark S. McLeod-Harrison 
George Fox University 
Abstract: Typically theologians take the image of God rather 
metaphorically and reduce the metaphor to a set of properties in 
virtue of which we are humans. This emphasis on the common 
features shared among humans supports the doctrine of shared sin 
and the provision of salvation by another human, Jesus. By analyzing 
three separate notions of image and applying them to the image of 
God, this paper argues that humans as God’s image can be taken more 
literally then it typically is. The result is that the uniqueness of each 
human is a significant aspect of the human person, grounding our 
value. Doing so, however, does not entail that we lose the common 
features of humans supporting theological accounts of shared sin and 
salvation. 
Suppose two painters go to northern California, set up their easels and paint 
images of Mt. Shasta. While there is a very good chance the two paintings will 
appear similar, sharing certain properties, they need not. Suppose one painter is a 
realist and his painting “looks like the mountain” whereas the other painter is a 
cubist and her painting looks (virtually) nothing like the mountain. Both, however, 
label their paintings “Mt. Shasta at Morning Light” and both mean their labels to be 
taken literally. The resulting paintings, although both images of Mt. Shasta, appear 
to share little in common. It is hard to see how any property of one is a property of 
the other except at a trivial level (say, both are painted on canvass, with oils, and the 
like). One might be black and grey, portraying various angles of the mountain (the 
cubist) and the other (the realist) might be bright red and orange, portraying a “true 
to life” single angle, and so forth. Images are not only unique but sometimes hardly 
rooted in “the way things are.”  
It’s perhaps curious then, that when we think of humans as the image of God, 
we typically don’t think of uniqueness. If we think of the image of God as pictures at 
all (which isn’t, I think, common), we tend to think of cookie cutter images, each of 
us being enough like God that we are recognizably the same. The notion of cookie 
cutter images is then standardly understood in (traditional) Christian thinking by 
taking a platonic approach to what it is to be human. It thus cashes out the nature of 
humanity in terms of (essential) properties such as rationality, emotional richness, 
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volition, and spirituality.1 Frequently, in other words, Christian theology takes the 
image-of-God language of scripture as mere metaphor for something more 
important. That is, the term “image” is taken to need reduction to some other term 
or terms that are literal. I want to challenge that approach. 
With that challenge as my over-all goal, section I suggests some reasons why 
Christian theologians may be reluctant to take the image-of-God language of 
scripture too literally in particular with regard to sin and salvation. Sections II-IV 
describe three ways of understanding the term “image,” each relevant to the image 
of God. Section V applies the results of II-IV to the theological context of humans 
made in the divine image. Section VI reflects again briefly on sin and salvation.  
I 
Why don’t we take the phrase “image of God” as literal? For one thing, images 
can be wildly different from one another as noted in the first paragraph. That seems 
incongruent with the role the notion of the image of God plays in Christian theology 
and philosophy. For one thing, if we eschew taking the image language as literal, it is 
easier for Christian philosophers and theologians to suggest that we have common 
ground with our secular colleagues. We can say, for example, that humans are what 
we are because of some set of necessary properties by which we are all united. This 
sort of view grounds moral obligation and the possibility of universal virtues. But 
more important for our purposes here, the power of the essentialist reading of the 
image language plays right into how we understand two major Christian doctrines, 
sin and salvation.  
The common nature of humanity roots the doctrine of sin. We are all born 
into sin because we share the same nature as Adam and Eve. When they fell, we fell. 
Whatever sin did to us, the fact that we all have the same essential properties is 
what allows sin to be passed from one to the other down through history.2 The fact 
that we all have the image of God (in the form of essential properties) supports the 
doctrine of original sin. That shared nature is a corrupted nature passed along 
generationally. 
Of course, there are other ways to think of sin’s presence in all humans. 
Perhaps it is not that certain shared properties allow for the universal presence of 
sin but rather that we have a common ancestry and history that allows for sin to be 
passed on. Suppose, for example, sin is passed on only by example from parent to 
child or from folks in the neighborhood to residents therein. Sin is a result, in such a 
1 The non-physical properties that might be found on the list of essential properties is quite long. 
Besides those mentioned in the text, one could include knowledge, moral sensibility, power, wisdom, 
and others. I’ll stick to the list I provided in the text, but it is meant neither to be exclusive nor 
exhaustive.  
2 Curiously, being sinful is not one of the essential properties of humans, otherwise we could never be 
freed from it. While it seems clear that sin negatively affected the image of God in us, how that relates 
to essential properties is less than clear. That is a topic I’ll not enter here but it seems very much 
worth exploring.  
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view, not of nature but of nurture. Such a view, taken strictly, seems open to the 
possibility that some of us escape sin. But then the doctrine of original sin seems 
unrooted metaphysically. It seems that however sin is passed on through history, it 
is passed on via the mechanisms by which we are all human, viz., by some set of 
properties we all share in common in some non-accidental way. Even with the 
Orthodox view that denies the Augustinian notion of the original sin and affirms that 
each of us sins individually, there remains an ontological affinity shared among 
humans. Humans are all finite and in the fall we fail to take up the opportunity to 
live fully into God’s grace.  
Here another issue might be raised. During the late medieval period much 
ink was spilled over various realisms and nominalisms. One of the upshots of some 
of the nominalisms is a denial of the existence of universals. Only individuals exist. 
On the latter views, it is not entirely clear (again) how sin is communicated from one 
generation to the next. On such views, individuals may be alike (even exactly alike) 
without there being some platonic (real) property they all share. We then pick out 
such likenesses via universal terms where the terms refer not to some existing 
universal entity but merely to the individuals themselves. But it then becomes 
mysterious why we call all humans “human” besides the fact that we do. 
Furthermore, what such nonimalisms do to the doctrine of sin appears to be to 
divide sin up into as many sorts of sin as there are individuals. While that may be 
the case, it is not clear that that captures the notion of original sin. We have all fallen 
short of the glory of God.  
The nominalism/realism discussion also picked up the question of salvation. 
Did Christ die for humankind or for individual humans? Arguably the doctrine of 
salvation through Christ finds its roots in taking the image of God to be something 
we all share. Since Christ is human he also is made in the image of God. His image, 
however, is without sin. Hence Christ can save us by his life, death and resurrection, 
effectively answering the question cur deus homo? Christ takes on the image of God, 
understood as a set of essential properties. Such a view seems to stand behind the 
typically Protestant notion of Christ as the “federal head” of humanity, thus 
supplying the (realist) means via which Christ can both represent us and provide a 
substitution for us.3 Here there are some details we must set aside. Which 
properties does Christ take on? Is it the property of “being human?” Or is it some set 
of properties in virtue of which Christ is human? Either way, Christ is fully human 
and philosophers and theologians often think we are saved in part by being 
members of the same kind—viz., the human kind—of which Jesus is a member. By 
taking on the image of God, Christ works in reverse what we find in the doctrine of 
sin. Through one person, Adam, sin enters the world; through one person, Jesus, sin 
is overcome. What Adam corrupted, Jesus uncorrupts and because we are made in 
the image of God, because we share the same essential properties, sin can be 
overcome by the perfect life and sacrifice of Christ. 
The advantage of having a shared, essential human nature seems thus to be 
sewn up in a nice, neat theological package. Without a shared human essence, it’s 
3 I’d like to thank Jeannine Graham for a helpful discussion of the ways in which theologians have 
viewed the transmission of sin.  
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not clear how sin could be original or how Christ could save us. In other words, it’s 
not clear how taking the image-of-God language of the scriptures as anything but 
metaphorical can provide for either of these theological necessities. Images we tend 
to think are mere copies (a point I’ll discuss further below) and copies are not 
related to one another in a sophisticated enough way philosophically to ground 
these two central doctrines. Since two copies of the same original can be 
substantially different, if, in fact, we take the image of God language as literal, it 
looks as though perhaps nothing unites us essentially. Each of us is a mere copy of 
God (some better, one might suppose, some worse). So while the image-of-God 
language lends itself well to pointing up the uniqueness of the human individual it 
may not point toward the commonality of all the members of the race. Insofar as we 
are unique creations of God, in other words, we run the risk of disconnecting 
humans one from the other and perhaps from Jesus himself. The potential 
uniqueness of images would tend to undermine the unity of human persons if we 
were to be literal images of God.  
I propose that Christian theologians and philosophers are often beguiled by 
two notions. First, is the long-standing cultural assumption rooted in Plato’s 
powerful observation that when X copies Y, X is less real than Y. X as an image thus 
misleads us by taking us away from truth and toward error. Hence, the idea that 
humans are made in the image of God must be a metaphor for something else, 
something philosophers and theologians can grapple with, something about which 
true or universal things can be said. Perhaps something similar is behind the ancient 
prohibition against making images of God or perhaps against any images at all. “You 
shall not make for yourself a graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in 
heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; 
you shall not bow down to them or serve them; for I the LORD your God am a jealous 
God” (Exodus 20: 4, 5a RSV). Perhaps Moses would have agreed with Plato about 
images. But if images mislead, somehow pulling on our emotions rather than our 
reason, philosophy and theology somehow gets at reality and truth. So thought Plato 
and maybe Moses.4  
The second beguiling notion is that since God is a spirit rather than a body, 
and since humans are bodies, or have bodies, the image of God in humans cannot be 
bodily. The image of God must be non-material. Hence, rationality, emotional 
richness, volition, and spirituality are likely candidates for what scripture means 
when it’s talking about the image of God. The image of God cannot be our bodies. A 
related factor feeding this sort of argument is also Greek, viz., that what is truly 
valuable is not the body but the soul. If God made us in the divine image, it must be a 
spiritual image, matter being somewhat suspect. No matter how much theologians 
have tried to correct this notion, it is still very much with us.  
I argue below that understanding the image-of-God language more literally 
can, in fact, make sense of the doctrines of sin and salvation both of which rely on 
properties being shared among humans. Our being individual images of God does 
4 Of course the context of the prohibition against images in Exodus is far more complicated than I’ve 
indicated. Indeed, it may be that no image was to be made in order to worship it or because we 
humans already are the image of God or perhaps for some other reason.  
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not rule out our having essential properties that we share in common and thus unite 
us as children of God. Indeed, I suggest that being unique is, in fact, one of the 
essential properties God gives to us. My argument that our individual uniquenesses 
are the image of God also has the result that we have theological grounds for our 
(fairly recent cultural) celebratory emphasis on diversity and uniqueness. Finally, 
the shift in emphasis developed here helps to make sense out of the intuition that 
our uniqueness as individuals makes us valuable. Even though this intuition is 
widely held (at least in popular culture) it is not widely defended or explained in 
either theology or philosophy. By approaching the notion of the image of God as the 
source of my being unique, my moral and spiritual value can be grounded in what is 
truly special about me and not merely the fact that you, I, and all of us together are 
alike “under the skin.”  
II 
What does the term image mean? Many things, lexically. One dictionary lists 
seventeen entries, both nouns and verbs. I discuss only three. One common 
understanding of image depends on a particular structure and relationship. 
Typically there is a (pre-existing) entity that something else copies, resembles or 
represents. I’ll call this the “object/image dichotomy” and images that result from it 
“dichotomous images.” Often, this sort of imaging involves a physical image of 
another physical thing.   
Typically we talk about such imaging in terms of there first being something 
real and then an image of it. This pattern of talk has created havoc in the way we 
think about images, beginning with Plato’s observation that art merely copy what is 
real and are, therefore, less real and, therefore, misleading. Art, suggests Plato, is 
simply not reality but a copy of it from which ensues the entire philosophy vs. 
poetry debate. In response, it is important to note that an image, although typically 
copying, resembling, or representing another real thing, is still, itself, real. Twentieth 
century art and art theory pick up this theme.5  
The problem perhaps originates with the notion of copying. In general terms, 
to copy X implies that X already exists (or at least did exist). There is a temporal 
ordering that typically attaches to copying. The original object comes first and the 
copied image second. However, not all images have that sort of structure. Y can 
resemble X without X having come first temporally. Y and X merely have to be alike 
in some feature or other. Of course, the more alike two things are, the more likely 
the judgment will be made that the two things resemble one another, and certainly 
the better the copy, the more the copy resembles the original.  
Representation need not imply resemblance or copying. Virtually anything 
could represent some other thing, given the right circumstances. A rock can 
represent, for example, the Queen of England, or the Queen of England represent a 
country, or a country freedom. So we really have two sorts of dichotomous images: 
5See for example discussions by Arthur Danto in (Danto 1983). 
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copy and representational. The only common rule among the two seems to be that if 
X represents or copies Y, then X and Y cannot be numerically identical. There are 
exceptions, perhaps. One can represent oneself in a courtroom in lieu of hiring a 
lawyer. That seems to be something of an anomaly, however, deriving from the fact 
that one typically has a lawyer represent one under legal circumstances. We may 
simply use the term “represent” here because one typically has a representative. In 
fact, however, I believe these sorts of cases involve imaging of another sort, to which 
I return in section IV. 
With a dichotomous image we are dealing with two real things whose 
relationship includes a more or less complex sort of logical dependency. 
Fundamentally, the relationship is not causal in the sense that when X copies or 
represents Y, Y brought X into being. In the case of copies, however, without Y’s 
existence (now or in the past), X couldn’t be a copy of Y. Yet insofar as X copies Y, Y 
is causally relevant for at least some of the features of X, viz., those features X and Y 
have in common. I’ll say that if X copies Y, Y is present to a causal chain of events 
such that, without Y being present to the chain, X would not copy Y. This is not true 
with resemblances. X can resemble Y without Y being present to the causal chain 
that brings X about. The same is true in the opposite direction as well. That is, if Y 
resembles X, X need not be present to the causal chain that brings Y about. In other 
words, X and Y can resemble each other without the resemblance having anything to 
do with a mutual or overlapping history. Not so with copies. If X copies Y, there is a 
mutual or overlapping history. Finally, any and all copy relationships involve 
resemblance but not all resemblances involve copies.  
When X represents Y, however, there is even less of a logical connection. X 
can represent Y just by my saying that it does, as when I pick up a rock, set it on the 
table, and say that it represents (or is) the Queen of England. Representations are 
rooted in social or cultural relationships rather than any historical presence of the 
object to the representation. Often, of course, things that represent also copy or 
resemble the things being represented, but they need not. However, when X copies 
Y, X (the image) can standardly (although not necessarily) be thought to represent 
(the object) Y.  
Also, while standardly X’s copying Y does not include Y being the cause of X, it 
can. A picture of an apple is not caused by an apple. However, an artist can sketch 
herself, thereby copying herself and as such is both the causal source of the image as 
well as the object in the causal chain in which the shared features of the object and 
image are rooted. Here, so to speak, the picture of the apple is caused by the apple. 
In relation to this, cases of copying always involve intentionality, at least with 
artifacts. One must set out to copy something. Hence something’s being a copy of 
another is not accidental or arbitrary. A piece of driftwood on the beach can 
resemble a person, but it doesn’t copy a person. That is why an artist can copy 
herself and be the causal source of the copy. The history of a copy includes the 
intentional making of a copy whereas the history of a resembling image need not 
include intentional making at all.  
With natural objects, at least those that fall into natural kinds, intentionality 
may not be, and typically is not, involved. But information is shared from object to 
image. In natural reproduction, a mother lion gives birth to offspring which are 
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copies of the mother. Here genetic coding carries the information for the copy and 
the mother (and father) are causes of the copy, as well as present to the causal 
chain. So in copies, whether artifactual or natural, information sharing occurs from 
object to copy.  
Representation is similar to copying in regard to intentionality. It requires 
the intentional “making” of a representation. At some point, someone intends that X 
represents Y. While perhaps X might come to represent Y via a lost history (where 
no one can remember how one object came to represent another—say X marking 
the spot on a map where the treasure is: why not a T, for example?), there is still an 
intentional acceptance of X representing Y. Resemblance alone seems to be 
independent of our intending one thing to resemble another or even independent of 
informational sharing.  
Let’s consider briefly how images are related to some other mental processes 
that generate them. There are, for example, images that seem to “come out of one’s 
head.” Such images don’t seem to copy another actual physical entity. Here we must 
be careful, for even images that do come “out of one’s head” may still copy some 
other (physical) thing or at least something based on physical things. One’s idea of 
an apple derives from having seen apples, and if an artist has never seen an apple, 
but merely had an apple described to her, her idea of an apple will ultimately be 
based on someone’s having seen one. There are complications here that I need not 
attend to in detail, but should be mentioned. One’s idea of an apple might be a very 
“visual” idea. That is, some people are quite adept at conjuring up a (mental) image 
in their minds and then are able to draw what they see in their “mind’s eye.” Those 
mental images, one might say, create a “virtual” reality that is then copied in the 
physical image (drawing, painting, sculpture, etc.). Sometimes one hears artists say 
“that’s what I was seeing, that’s what I wanted to draw” only after the sketch is on 
the paper but where, in fact, they did not have a model (physically) in front of them.  
Others don’t, apparently, think in pictures but rather think fundamentally in 
words or concepts. Such a person might think “I’ll draw an apple” and not, in fact, 
conjure up a virtual mental image of an apple but just have what might be thought of 
(in philosopher’s jargon) as a “mental representation” of an apple. That last phrase, 
“mental representation” (that could, of course, include what I just called “virtual 
mental image”) is loaded philosophically and I’m going to by-pass it as a distraction 
from my main point. Let’s just say that in any (physical) image making, the image is 
always mediated by the mind or its ideas or thoughts. Typically there is a physical 
object (or some idea based on physical objects) that falls on the “object” side of the 
object/image dichotomy and even though that is mediated through ideas or 
thoughts, the resulting (physical) image is an image of another physical object or 
thoughts derived from experiencing physical objects. That is true even where one 
“makes up” a physical object to then image. The last thought allows for fictional 
objects to be imaged as dichotomous images. For example, one could dichotomously 
image a fruit from the planet Zorb, something no human has ever seen before. 
Nevertheless, it would be “constructed” out of what other physical things look like—
shapes, sizes, colors, etc. As Descartes notes, even the (physical) things I dream 
about borrow from (physical) things I’ve experienced.  
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The last two paragraphs are related to copies but less clearly to 
resemblances. One can discover resemblances in nature without there being any 
corresponding creatively derivative work in the mind’s eye.6 It remains, of course, 
that the mind is doing some work in noting the resemblances. The same is true 
where X represents Y. No mental imaging of the sort required in copying is needed, 
yet there is clearly mental work going on that links X with Y. In noting resemblances, 
one mentally compares the two objects. In representations, however, one must 
recognize a cultural “announcement” (or make one) of X representing Y. Of course, it 
may make it easier for us to recognize that X represents Y if, in fact, X resembles Y in 
some way but X need not resemble Y to represent.7  
Many times when we use the term “image” we have something like 
dichotomous images in mind. The limiting factor in the discussion thus far is the 
emphasis on the physical. While many images are physical, not all are. That some 
images are not physical is most certainly true in representations where both 
physical and non-physical entities can represent either physical or non-physical 
things. The flag can represent courage, courage can represent the best in humanity, 
my thought about my mother can represent my mother, and finally, a stone, the 
Queen. What of copies? We say things like “his thought pattern copies Einstein’s, 
with such and so difference.” Do such dichotomous images follow the same patterns 
as those with physical objects? It appears so. Copying involves the necessity of the 
object being present to the causal chain that leads to the image, whereas 
resemblance need not. Representational imaging is a sort of social construct not 
rooted in copies or resemblance.   
In summary, dichotomous images can be physical and non-physical but come 
in two sorts: copies and representations. Copies involve the presence of the object to 
the causal chain leading to the image, and representations involve a decisional 
aspect of someone denoting that X represents Y even where neither copying nor 
resemblance is present.  
III 
I turn now to a second sort of image. Although not as common as the first 
one, there is a use of “image” that, if you will, carries its object with it. In this sense 
to be an image is to be an example of, the epitome of, or to typify.8  For instance, we 
might say that Joe is the image of a football player or Mary is the image of a CEO. 
What this sense of image picks out depends a good deal on the tone of voice with 
6 Here I’m setting aside the creative mental work that may go on in recognizing resemblances. 
7 It is also worth noting that lots of things besides images are related in similar ways to ideas as are 
copies. Cars, computers, and apple pies, for example. Although we sometimes refer to such things as 
images, as when, for example, we say the 1959 Cadillac is the image of post-war, American self-
congratulation, typically we don’t call cars “images.” The process of making a car involves images, of 
course—sketches of proto-types, for example. However, that is art and often it is only art that draws 
out the term “image” for us. Of course, art covers a lot of territory. 
8 http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/image?s=t 
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which judgments about it are expressed. Both these examples can suggest a 
caricature of the sort of object under consideration. “Mary is the image of a CEO” 
could be pejorative, suggesting a negative picture not only of Mary but of CEOs in 
general. Similarly “Joe is the image of a football player” could suggest a negative 
picture of football players and Joe as well. Or both could be positive. Mary or Joe 
could image the best of being a CEO or a football player where being a CEO or a ball 
player is considered a good thing in its own right. In both the positive and the 
negative versions, however, what is meant depends further on the distinctions 
among examples, epitomes, and typifications.  
To say X is typical of the set of Ys is often to say that X’s properties are the 
properties commonly found attached to Ys. To say X is an example of the set of Ys is 
often to say the same sort of thing—X’s properties are what are commonly found 
among Ys—but to be typical implies a stricter account for what is typical of a set 
would not normally be capable of being a poor example of the set, whereas a mere 
example could be a poor example. Finally, for X to epitomize the set of Ys seems 
somewhat stronger than either being an example or being typical. To epitomize 
often picks out what is distinctive of the set or what is a superlative example of the 
set. Of course, there are no hard and fast rules here. Sometimes we do use “typical” 
and “epitome” interchangeably, or we add a “best” to “example” with a similar 
meaning in mind. What’s important to notice, however, is that to be the best 
example or most typical or the epitome of a set can itself be ambiguous. The 
ambiguity arises out of depicting what members of the set are generally like 
(“general typifying”), having in mind not what is generally true but making a value 
judgment (about what the ideal member would look like), and picking the closest 
example of that (“ideal typifying”). Which we use depends on our purposes.  
For all their ambiguities, let’s call these “typifying images.” The typifying 
image minimally resembles the other members of the set. To have a typifying image 
of a set, we must have a set made of members that resemble one another in some 
significant way. Some sets have members that do not resemble one another much, if 
at all, beyond the trivial feature of being members of the same set. One could put 
typewriters, ghosts, and moon shots into the same set and one would be hard 
pressed to say how they resemble one another, whereas mules, donkeys, and horses 
would be easier to describe in terms of their resemblances. To have a typifying 
image, the set must be constructed of significantly resembling members. The more 
the members of the set resemble one another, the easier it is to say why these things 
belong to the set and the easier it is to find a typifying image. However, the 
resemblances need not be exactly the same in each member of the set.  
There is obviously an overlap between dichotomous images and typifying 
images. As noted, sets can be made up of all sorts of wildly dissimilar things, so not 
all sets will have typifying imaging members. But typifying images do not merely 
represent the set. As we’ve seen, representation can be done with no resemblance at 
all (except perhaps the most general—perhaps being things, for example). To typify 
or epitomize, one has to resemble. In fact, one has to resemble in the right way. What 
is the right way? To some degree, that depends on the purposes one has. Consider 
“Joe is the image of a good football player.” (Notice the addition of “good” into the 
earlier example). Is our purpose to pick out some set of general features of all 
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football players? What would those be? It’s not “big and burly” or “can run fast.” Nor 
is it “good throwing arm” or “good on the catch.” Wide receivers have different 
features than quarterbacks, and quarterbacks than centers. And all of them have 
different features than the defensive players. To typify a good football player in 
general may have little directly to do with the particular game of football: team 
player, ability to concentrate, etc. Perhaps better to say “Joe is the image of a good 
quarter back” or whatever one more specifically wants to pick out. 
Consider the other example: “Mary is the image of a good CEO.” (Again, note 
the addition of “good.”) The category of “CEO” is in some ways narrower than that of 
football player, so perhaps it is tempting to respond that it is easier to say what 
would make a typifying member for CEOs than football players. Yet the problem 
doesn’t go away. We could ask: “Do you mean good CEO in terms of bringing in a 
huge profit, leading people well, knowing when to hire, when to fire, or speaks well 
to the board?” Without the “good,” typifying the CEO might be easier (as it would be 
with football player). Any CEO would do, perhaps, so long as the CEO ran a 
corporation. Here the ambiguity between the ideal and the general comes to the 
fore. To be clear about a typifying image, we have to ask some detailed questions 
about what it is we want to capture; that is, what is our purpose in trying to typify or 
epitomize a set of entities?  
IV 
I turn now to a third and narrower but related sense of image. It is, perhaps, a 
philosopher’s sense of image. Consider single-membered sets, sets consisting of a 
unique member. Take that member as an image of the members of the set. In that 
case, the singular set member images itself. Unlike with typifying images—where 
one thing epitomizes or typifies the other things in the set by resembling them—in 
this case, the thing that is the image just is (fully and completely) the thing in the set. 
Looked at in one way, such an image also epitomizes the members of the set but in a 
narrowed down or even trivial sense of epitomize. In another sense, however, such 
an image truly epitomizes the members of the set because it simply is all the 
members of the set. It’s not that one thing represents or copies the others in the set; 
the thing doing the imaging is the only thing in the set. “Resemblance,” “copy,” and 
“representation” are the wrong terms. “Presentation” is closer. The image presents 
itself or, one could just as well say, that the object presents itself. In short, the image 
just is the object and the object the image. In this case, the image truly does bring its 
object with it. I’ll call this the “presentational image.”  
One final point about images. The typifying image appears to bridge 
dichotomous and presentational images. On the one hand, the typifying image 
resembles the other members of the set. On the other hand, the typifying image is a 
member of the set itself and thus presents at least one member of the set. Although 
not identical to the set, it is at least identical to one member of the set. It could be 
said to be a presentational image of the subset made up of the singular member that 
typifies the larger set. 
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V 
To take up the topic of the image of God in humans, we need to reflect on 
what sort of image humans are. It is too quick and easy to simply replace the image 
language of the scriptures with the philosophical language of essences. Further, I 
believe that is a mistake. Since their early reflections on the biblical witness, 
theologians have approached the image of God by saying humans have an essence—
that is, (the capacity for) thought, emotional richness, will, and creativity. 
Rationality is often the main notion used by theologians to explain what the biblical 
writers meant when the former thinkers unpacked the notion of the image of God in 
us. Here we confront some of the prejudices against images and for philosophical 
abstractions that rest in Plato’s lap. Images mislead, he told us, whereas philosophy 
tells the truth. While I don’t deny human essences (and in fact they are important for 
a variety of theological reasons) I do want to think more seriously about the image 
qua image. To say that we are made in the image of God is not the same as saying 
that certain universals are instantiated in us. To be made in the image of God is a 
making, not an instantiating from abstract universals to the concrete instances of 
those universals, even if the former (making) involves the latter (instantiating). 
Adam is made from dirt and God’s breath into the image of God. It is too easy and 
quick, again, to treat the image language as mere metaphor and replace it with 
philosophical theory. What if we treat the language of image as literal, or at least as 
literally as we can?9  
First, we have to acknowledge that in our being made in God’s image there is 
no physical object (God is not physical) even though the resulting humans are 
themselves physical. Now the notion of physicality is itself problematic 
philosophically. Perhaps those philosophers who suggest that we have no 
uncontroversial notion of physicality are correct. But the point I want to make can 
survive those philosophical challenges by noting that I take “physical” to refer to 
what we typically think of as every day, furniture-sized objects such as, well, 
furniture or human bodies or pieces of grass or over-ripe strawberries. I won’t 
worry here, in other words, about trying to answer the challenges of Wilfred Sellar’s 
pink ice-cube question (how is the phenomenon of the pink ice cube to be 
maintained when we know that the ultimate parts of the cube are neither pink nor 
cold nor ice, etc.?).  Whatever God is, God is not an entity anywhere on the spectrum 
from parts to whole as we would (or might come to) understand that spectrum as 
we contemplate the objects of our (physically rooted) experience around us. God, 
being bodiless, simply is not physical, whatever the term “physical” ends up picking 
out. God creates the physical but is not, in the divine being, physical.  
9 I don’t mean to imply that I think God literally made Adam out of the dust of the ground. But to say 
that God literally created an image of the divine self does not imply that every scriptural reference 
should be taken literally. God could very well have used (and I think probably did) an evolutionary 
scheme to make humans in the divine image. That can be literal without treating the text of scripture 
as scientific description.  
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In discussions of the image of God it is common to note that the image is not 
physical. What is typically meant is that our bodies do not have anything to do with 
the image of God that is in us. Our spiritual or non-physical attributes image God. 
But in walking that route we don’t take the image language very seriously. We make 
physical images of non-physical things with fair regularity. Some flags are physical 
images of freedom, for example.10 We can take the U.S. flag as an example (although 
it is not the only good one). A flag as an image is a merely representational image, 
however. It seems that what’s going on with the image of God in humans is not 
merely representational (hence not merely socially created) but closer to copying.  
But there are plenty of examples of physical images that copy, not merely 
represent, non-physical things. Consider the 1959 Cadillac. It was an image of 
American post-war self-congratulation and prowess, especially since Harley Earl 
had American greatness in mind as he designed the largest tail fins for a car in 
history, right down to the bullet-shaped tail lights! Many car designers of the 1950s 
used WW2 fighter planes as models for their work, which adds to the complexity of 
how physical and nonphysical symbols and images interact, and links the post-war 
self-congratulatory attitude to very physical images. One can begin with a non-
physical notion (self-congratulation or prowess) and end up with a physical image 
of it. 
Corporate trademarks are examples of physical images that copy non-
physical entities. In thinking of what a corporation is like, graphic artists try to 
capture in a physical image the “essence” of the corporation. (And by corporation, I 
mean not the people, or the business that a corporation engages in, but the non-
physical, legal entity that is the corporation and its social features.) Think of Ronald 
MacDonald or the Nike “swoosh.” (Note that the image is called a “swoosh” rather 
than a sloppy checkmark.) One finds something similar in book cover images: a 
physical image captures the non-physical topic of a book. Take, for instance, Nelson 
Goodman’s Ways of Worldmaking, a book about how human noetic work makes the 
many ways the world is. Suppose it had a better cover than it actually does, a cover 
with a number of wooden blocks—with no letters, numbers, or colors on them—
stacked in some sort of order. That physical image would capture the non-physical 
topic of the book quite well. Does it resemble the theme of the book? Yes. Does it 
copy it? Well, why not?   
In like manner, humans in their very physical bodies may copy God’s very 
non-physical being. Of course, there is a lot of overlap between non-physical 
characteristics of the human person (thought, emotion, will, etc.) and the non-
physical God. But in fact, for the most part, our experience with the divine is 
embodied in people we know, the nature we experience, and, of course, the Jesus we 
love and worship. Nevertheless, the plausibility of the very physical bodies we have 
copying the non-physical God is not that difficult to grasp. Our bodies act, think, 
10 An anonymous reviewer noted that flags might be better understood as symbols than as images. 
That may be true, and it raises the question of the relationship between symbols and images, a 
subject of interest and importance but too large to take on here.  
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create, and so on.11 The separation of these features of humans from the body is 
perhaps driven by the desire to turn the image language of scripture into decorative 
metaphor.  
But we need to say more, for the image of God into which we are made is 
arguably not a copy of God’s properties—intellect, emotion, creativity, moral 
capacity, spirit and so forth—but a copy of God. God of course has certain properties 
or capacities (God thinks, emotes, creates, is spirit, etc.). But God is not making 
images of abstract entities but making images of the divine self.  The properties God 
has are, of course, instantiated in the individual humans (as arguably they are in the 
divine persons), but the instantiation of properties is not the making of the image or 
the image itself. The image—the made copy—is the concrete person, the individual 
human.  
God’s making us in the divine image seems to follow the same sort of pattern 
we find in dichotomous imaging. First there is something real and then a copy is 
made of it; object then image. But the image of God, as it is typically understood in 
theology, is a “shared” image. This is the place where it is tempting to ignore the 
actual language of scripture, replacing the notion of image with the notion of 
essential properties which are shared by all humans qua human. But that is not 
what an image is.  
Let’s say two things accidentally resemble a third. Under those 
circumstances, we have resemblance but not copying. But in the making of X in the 
image of Y, one is not merely making a resemblance (although one is also doing that) 
but one is copying. In the case of the accidental resemblance, there is no copy. 
Copied images seem to be singular, with each image an image of the object itself. 
The resemblance it has, let’s say, to other copies is of course not totally accidental 
because each copy is a copy of the original. But neither is the resemblance among 
copies planned, or at least it need not be. Two copies of one object resemble each 
other not as copies of one another, but as copies of the original object. A copied 
image is not an image simply because it instantiates the same properties of the 
object. There is a causal history that is vital to its being a copy. The image is a 
concrete, non-universal entity, a particular and historical uniqueness in the world. 
The image of God that each of us is, is an individual life with human properties 
instantiated in the particular space, time, culture, and peculiarities in which we find 
ourselves.   
A problem may arise here. If we start with the image as a real entity and have 
that as the primary sort of thing each of us is (with each individual copy of God 
standing on its own, so to speak), and then understand the shared properties as 
secondary (with our commonality not being the main feature of humans), don’t we 
end up with the image of God as shaky ground for sin and salvation? That conclusion 
is too hasty. That we are unique copies of God individually does not entail that there 
is nothing in common among us. It only places the commonalities in the right 
perspective.  
11 My suggestion here may require the rejection of Cartesian dualism in which one’s soul or spirit 
does things with one’s body. Since I generally reject dualisms of that sort, I find no problem with that.  
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What I’ve suggested does not, in other words, deny that insofar as each of us 
is made in God’s image that each of us resembles one another or that we do, in fact, 
instantiate essential properties. But it is the copying that makes us in the image of 
God and not the resembling or instantiating per se. Consider an analogy. All copy-
images, say, of Mt. Denali, share some set of common properties in virtue of which 
they are images of Denali, just as all copy-images of God share something in 
common in virtue of which they are images of God. Now it is primarily because they 
are copies of Denali that they resemble Denali, they are not copy-images of Denali 
just because they resemble one another. No resemblance the images have to one 
another is enough to make them copies of Denali. They could resemble one another 
and be copies of each other without being copies of Denali. So it is with humans. We 
could all resemble one another, or we could all be instantiations of certain 
properties without being copy-images of God. In fact, that is often what secular 
philosophies from the Enlightenment on have said. No need for God, just a need for 
some sort of platonic essences in the universe that all humans happen to share, and 
that is enough to ground, for example, ethical treatment.  
Be that as it may, if we want to emphasize the uniqueness of the image of God 
that each of us is—that is, if we want to emphasize the fact that we are made images 
of God—we’ll need to say more of how the instantiation of a property is a unique 
instantiation. The notion of essences and instantiation is a large and complicated 
topic. There are a variety of ways in which the term “essence” is used. We are 
working with kind-essences. When we think of kind-essences, we typically think of 
necessary properties. To be a member of a kind (here I’m talking about natural 
kinds rather than artifactual kinds—dogs and stars rather than cogs and cars) is to 
have certain properties without which one wouldn’t be in the kind. Whatever the 
properties are that make humans human, we all have them. Often, and for the most 
part traditionally, essences or necessary properties are thought of along realist 
lines. By “realist” I mean that for the vast majority of natural things in the world, 
they are what they are independent of human noetic contributions. So cows have 
bovine essential properties independent of what any human person wishes about, 
believes about, or otherwise thinks about cows. Kinds (natural ones, at any rate) are 
found or discovered not made by humans.  
However, one need not be a strict realist about properties in order for kinds 
to be rooted in a reality independent of human noetic work. In fact, taking a more 
relaxed (partly irrealistic) approach to essences allows for more diversity among 
the individual (copied) images as I described them above. When talking about the 
essence of being human (the supposed image of God) it is common to take that 
essence realistically so that the image of God in you is the same as the image of God 
in me. Rationality, emotional richness, volition, etc. all turn up in each of us as realist 
essential properties. But perhaps the set of properties shared among humans need 
not be instantiations of the same abstract essence, except in a fairly limited way. 
Perhaps, instead, we each receive what I’ll call a “Wittgenstenian family 
resemblance” set of properties.  
The standard Wittgensteinian picture (as many seem to conceive of it), 
claims that if A, B, C, D, and E resemble one another, A is like B, B like C, and so forth. 
But A may not resemble E. That is, A may share no (resembling) properties with E. 
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Hence one game is like another and that one like another and so forth but the last 
game may not share anything in common with the first game, except being called a 
game. I propose a different view. By “Wittgensteinian family resemblances” I intend 
the following: Although A and E may be quite dissimilar, A and E still resemble each 
other because they have the same thin essence. A thin essence is made up of thin 
properties. Thin properties are more or less stripped down properties, properties 
that depend on thin concepts. For example, the thin concept “mind” might be 
something like “that aspect of the human person that thinks.” Such a concept will be 
filled out in the world by one’s conceptual scheme, noetic framework, and historical 
situation. How one thinks about the concept “mind” will, of course, be situated in 
one’s place in history which in turn will be influenced by one’s noetic commitments 
(including cultural understandings) and the particular conceptual scheme one has 
developed. Conceptual schemes include the richer, more filled out accounts of the 
thin concepts. One does not typically consider only the thin properties and their 
related essences or concepts of a thing unless one is considering the question: How 
are all these things united? One can and should ask that question, of course, and 
when it is asked, one turns to the barest account of the essence to place things into a 
resemblance set. So members of a set of entities are in the same resemblance set 
when considered on the thin level. The thin properties a thing has could hold across 
all conceptual schemes, noetic frameworks, and historical situations and thus 
provide for essences across schemes, frameworks, and situations.  
The thick properties, however, those that are embedded in the conceptual 
schemes, noetic frameworks, and historical situations, provide for various levels of 
uniqueness. In many instances, two things could resemble each other a great deal 
and in other cases not so much. Here is where Wittgensteinian resemblances enter 
the picture. Two members of the set at opposite ends of the resemblance continuum 
that ground a resemblance set would still (necessarily) have enough in common so 
that one could recognize them as members of the same set.12 The thin essences 
unite a set of objects but those thin essences are sometimes hard to see, for one has 
to whittle down through various thickened up accounts of the thin essences to find 
the thin. Here we need to consider typifying images briefly. One of the reasons for 
limiting Wittgensteinian resemblances the way I do is that if A and E (on opposite 
ends of the continuum) don’t resemble each other at all, then it’s hard to see how 
one could have a typifying member of the set, whether general or ideal.  
Let’s consider an example from the list of supposed essential properties 
typically used by theologians. Being rational on the thin level, let’s say, is the 
property of assessing claims for truth and acting on those claims. Now two 
philosophers could thicken up that property in quite different ways via alternative 
conceptual schemes (or alternative noetic frameworks). Looking at the 
philosophical literature on rationality, one could have one’s pick about how to 
thicken up the property. Any two of those ways of thickening up the thin notion of 
12 Phil Smith pointed out that another way to think of a resemblance set (rather than as the linear A, 
B, C, D, E) is as a complicated 3-D map. Consider a globe where areas are labeled by letters but on the 
surface A and E don’t touch at all. However, on the third dimensional level, A and E may connect.  I 
thank Phil for this observation as well as other comments on the penultimate draft of this paper.  
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rationality may be contradictory to one another. Typically that is reason to reject at 
least one of them. However, if a claim is true only within a conceptual scheme, noetic 
framework, or historical circumstance, then what is true is relative to conceptual 
schemes, noetic frameworks, or historical circumstances and the claims are not 
contradictory unless removed, per impossible, from their situations.13 Two people 
living their lives according to rationality, then, might be living in two substantially 
different ways. One’s rationality might not agree with another’s at all, in fact. This 
(irrealist) way of considering essences allows for necessary properties at the thin 
level but not at the thicker level. What is true at a thick level within a situation 
depends not on the “real” way the world is but on a variety of features deriving from 
the conceptual scheme, noetic framework, or historical circumstance. But still, at the 
thin level, it will turn out true in every situation that humans have certain thin 
essential properties.  
By way of analogy, when Nelson Goodman considers realism in painting, he 
makes the following observations. He describes two pictures, one realistic (that is, 
what we Westerners typically take to be realist, one that “looks like” nature, whose 
perspective is “ordinary” and whose colors are “normal”) and one in reverse 
perspective and whose colors are replaced by the normal colors’ complements.  He 
then says this:   
The two pictures . . . are equally correct, equally faithful to what they 
represent, provide the same and hence equally true information; yet 
they are not equally realistic or literal.  For a picture to be faithful is 
simply for the object represented to have the properties that the 
picture in effect ascribes to it.  But such fidelity or correctness or truth 
is not a sufficient condition for literalism or realism.  The alert 
absolutist will argue that for the second picture but not the first we 
need a key.  [In response,] . . . the difference is that for the first the key 
is ready at hand. . . . Just here, I think, lies the touchstone of realism [in 
the arts]:  not in quantity of information but in how easily it issues.  
And this depends upon how stereotyped the mode of representation 
is, upon how commonplace the labels and their uses have become.14  
The analogy is this. Just as what counts as a realistic painting depends not merely on 
content but on how easily the representation unmasks itself—how easily it issues 
from the painting—so the truth about human persons depends not merely on 
description but on how easily the truth unmasks itself from the historical 
circumstances. One can find, in short, the thin essential properties underneath the 
layers of thickened up descriptions and layers of historically rooted lives. So there is 
a real basis (a basis not relying on our histories, conceptual schemes, and noetic 
frameworks) that ties us all together, and yet each of us is unique in that we copy 
God in the particular, historically situated way that we do. Each of Goodman’s 
pictures stands in a copy (he says representational) relationship with what they 
13 See  my (McLeod-Harrison 2009) for further details on how this account might go. 
14 (Goodman 1968, 36) 
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copy but they are quite different and distinct portrayals of their object. Although 
quite different, they are equally real presentations of their objects even though one 
might be less familiar.   
Thus, while each person shares the same thin properties, how those 
properties are thickened up depends on historically rooted conceptual-schematic 
features. What being rational looks like for one person may be quite different from 
what it looks like for another. So instead of Wittgensteinian resemblances varying so 
much between A and E because A and E fail to have any properties in common, A 
and E can appear to have little in common because the thickened up versions of the 
properties are so disparate. All of this is consistent with the idea that God makes us 
in the divine image as copies of God. God is the object and each of us, in our 
historical, conceptually nuanced context, develops into the thickened up 
instantiation of the thin properties. Because we are made as images of God, the thin 
properties are always thickened up by the historical circumstance and its related 
(set of) conceptual schemes and noetic frameworks.   
The result of all this is that humans copy God, and hence resemble God, via 
historically conditioned properties that are copied from God in rather unique ways. 
Humans also resemble (but do not copy) each other at the thin level.15 Copying 
involves God being present to the causal chain of each human’s development 
whereas resemblance does not. Some of the differences in resemblance (even 
radical ones) can be explained via the Wittgensteinian resemblance properties being 
different from one another in quite significant ways at the thick level and yet similar 
enough at the thin level to count individuals as members of the same resemblance 
set. This resemblance, thus, is not accidental. 
Returning now more fully to the typifying image, we might ask for a typifying 
example of humanity in a theological context. Our first inclination might be to say 
that any one of us might be as good as any other to typify humanity. Let’s say that 
what it is to be human is to be made in the image of God. Each and every human is 
made thus. If we want to talk about thin properties that are essential to humans, we 
might say that to be human is to be capable (in principle) of rationality, emotions, 
creativity, free choices, or spirituality.16 Once again, any one of us would fit the bill 
as typical.  
But what of the other sense of typifying image—the ideal typifying image? 
Here we run into some substantial difficulties, for if we are in the set “human” 
15 Of course, there is a sort of copying going on with our genetically related children and ourselves. 
However, even there the copying seems to lack the intentional control over what the children are like.  
16 Here is important to note that all humans, even those who are extremely mentally challenged and 
have lived, let’s say, in a permanent vegetative state since birth are made in the image of God. Hence 
the importance when putting the image of God into philosophical terms to speak of “capacities in 
principle.”  It is also theologically (and morally) important to consider that Jesus holds up children as 
models of spirituality. “Let the children come to me, for to such belong the kingdom of God” (Mk 
10:14, RSV). He also indicates that the least will be the greatest and it is not difficult to infer that the 
most mentally challenged human will be, in fact, the greatest in the kingdom of heaven. As such, we 
may be honoring saints in serving those among us who are the least capable now of serving anyone. I 
owe this observation to my wife, Susan J McLeod-Harrison. 
On Being the Literal Image of God Mark S. McLeod-Harrison 
157 
because we resemble one another, we resemble one another in Wittgensteinian 
resemblances rooted in thin essential properties, at least according to my account. 
That is, we run into the problem that humans are so varied, and indeed, unique, that 
it is hard to point to any singular set of features by which one human can be 
suggested as an ideal. Since the ideal typifying image requires us to make certain 
value judgments, the vast differences among us might incline us to narrow the field. 
We might want to ask which aspects of humanity we desire to typify. Is it courage, 
creativity, rationality with emotional sensitivity, or something else? We might 
propose, for example, the heroic among us, or the great inventors, leaders, or other 
“important” figures. But if we try to pick out the ideal human, we are probably going 
to run into challenges of all sorts. There is a theological answer, however. Jesus 
might be the only human who fits the ideal account, for not only has he all the 
properties at the thin level that go into making up the human person, but he also 
lacks a property that keeps the rest of from being ideal: viz., sin. Whereas many 
other superlative human persons are superlative in having various of the thin 
properties thickened up in interesting and powerful ways, no one but Jesus can 
claim to be superlative in being without sin (by nature).17  
In addition, the fact that Jesus is without sin also implies that he is physically, 
psychologically, and emotionally whole and complete. While he is the unique person 
he is, he would also not suffer from the challenges and problems the rest of us have 
in terms of dealing with the stresses of life. I’m not saying he would not feel stress or 
anguish, or other emotions, but only that he would be capable of handling them well 
and appropriately. In this sense he would be a superlative human as well. 
Finally, the presentational image appears to be the sort of image that Christ is 
of God insofar as Jesus is divine. Since he is God, he doesn’t copy God, at least in the 
sense that we find him described in Colossians 1:15ff. So the image that Jesus is of 
God is a presentational image. Equally truly, I am the presentational image of myself. 
Since I am a member of the single-membered set made up solely of myself, I 
presentationally image myself, as do you yourself, and your neighbor herself, and so 
on. 
VI 
I want to weave these various themes together with some reflections on sin 
and salvation. Jesus is the presentational image of God, the unique member of the 
set “divine-human persons.” That makes him unique not only among humans, but 
among all the things in the universe. It would be a mistake, however, to think that 
that is all there is to Jesus’ uniqueness, viz., that he has a divine history. He also has a 
human history that is unique. He was born of Mary, taught carpentry by Joseph, 
walked along the road between Jerusalem and Bethany on a certain day in the year 
27, and so forth. We “regular” humans are unique in that same way. We are born of 
17 Here one might suggest the Roman Catholic version of Mary. She however, is sinless by grace, not 
nature. In fact, we can all become sinless by grace.  
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particular parents, raised in particular neighborhoods. In that way, each of us is the 
presentational image of ourselves. 
Jesus’ unique history as a divine person, however, includes becoming human 
and staying human. That is, the second person of the Trinity is forever the divine-
human. When the New Testament speaks of Jesus as the image of God (see 
Colossians 1:15ff, 2 Corinthians 4:4 and the related John 14:9, Hebrews 1: 1-4, 
Ephesians 4: 17-24, Romans 8:3 and Philippians 2: 7,8), it speaks of us seeing God 
(in the divine self) when we see Jesus the human. The two are not separated, as 
Chalcedon recognizes when it says Jesus has two natures and two wills but is one 
person. To see Jesus the human is the see Jesus the divine creator of the universe.  
What has that to do with our being made in the image of God? Just this: if 
Jesus is truly human, then he too is made in God’s image. That is, Jesus is as much 
the dichotomous image of God as we are. That explains, if my earlier description is 
right, why Jesus is unique as a human. He is the unique copy of God as is each of us. 
Yet there is something else about Jesus that is unique. When a “regular” human is 
made, she is made from scratch as a copy of God. But Jesus pre-exists his human 
incarnation and thus, in a sense, he copies humans when he is made the incarnate 
God. Whereas we all resemble one another because we copy God, Jesus resembles us 
because he copies us.18  
But Jesus copies us without sin. Sin, of course, is adventitious to humans. It is 
not a necessary property. When God incarnates as a human, he does not copy us in 
that respect. To put it as the Orthodox would, the image of God is separate from the 
likeness of God in the creation of humanity. The image of God is our reason, will, 
emotional richness, and creativity. But the likeness of God is our capacity for virtue, 
our capacity to be fully like God in the human way. Jesus becomes like God in the 
human way in his incarnation. We see God in Jesus because he has grown into the 
sort of reliance on God that is needful for true sanctification (true deification, as the 
Orthodox would say). He has by nature what we can have by grace. By nature, he 
never was sinful. He chose, in his earthly life, to shape his earthly being after God’s 
will rather than his own human will. That makes him the full image of God as a 
human. So not only is he God by nature, but he is the ideal typifying image of God as 
well, a human without sin, totally reliant on the will of God. His human will is 
amalgamated to God’s will and he thus lives out the life of God on earth.  
So Jesus is the presentational image of God (God in the divine self), the ideal 
typifying image of a human (in his sinless humanity) and the dichotomous image of 
God in his being made the unique human he is, a copy of God. Salvation is provided 
by God in Jesus because of the way these three images work together. Because Jesus 
is a copy of God as we are, his presence among us is related to us via both his 
uniqueness from us and his commonality with us. He is, via the thin properties that 
we all share, and in virtue of which we more or less resemble each other, the savior 
for all humanity. But he copies us as well in his uniqueness, his historicity, his being 
thickened up according to a conceptual scheme or noetic structure that places him 
18 One of the editors wondered why I haven’t taken up the Orthodox notion that Christ is the ikon of 
God and, as such, the archetype of humanity. I would affirm this Orthodox viewpoint as well, and 
hope to take it up elsewhere.  
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very much among the finite and contingent. His uniqueness is, in short, just as much 
a part of the image of God as is the fact that he shares the properties necessary for 
his being a human. But it is because he is the unique, particular example of the ideal 
human that we can learn to become like God as well (on the Orthodox view).  He 
chose to be like God and hence imaged God in the full way a human ought to and not 
merely in his rationality, emotional richness or creativity. He lived the life of 
sinlessness and thereby is the example of how it can be done.  
Thus we have the image of God, as much unique as it is shared. The 
implications of our uniqueness is not limited to the development of our individual 
ways of being in the world, but to the development of the wide variety of cultures 
and expressions of the celebration of the life God gives us. But it also influences how 
we should understand the nature of (original) sin and the nature of our salvation. 
We come to God both corporately and individually. When the rich young man asks 
Jesus what he must do to be saved, Jesus asks him if he’d followed the law. He had! 
Then Jesus says he lacks one more thing. He is to sell all his possessions and to 
follow Jesus. That is a very different approach to the particulars of salvation than he 
tells Nicodemus, the woman at the well, and Martha. Each of us comes to salvation in 
unique circumstances with our unique personalities, but also with the knowledge 
that we are all related to Jesus our brother. It is that relatedness that means Jesus’ 
singular life, death, and resurrection can save us.  
So we should celebrate our commonalities. They bind us together in our lives. 
But we should equally celebrate our uniqueness and our diversity for that is, indeed, 
the way the image of God is. 
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